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Abstract  
Of the Southeast Asian countries most badly affected by the 1997 financial crisis, 
Malaysia and Thailand remain the most unsettled by its political fallout. Their 
present political situations are not akin to ‘politics as usual’. Instead, they capture the 
unpredicted outcomes of post-crisis struggles to reorganize structures of economic 
and political power. Comparing the situations in Malaysia and Thailand, this paper 
focuses on their differing state and civil society engagements with neoliberalism. It is 
suggested that the post-crisis contestations, sometimes tied to pre-crisis conflicts in 
political economy, left something of a stalemate: neither neoliberalism nor the social 
movements satisfactorily fulfilled their agendas in either country.  
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And yet they came — not in large enough numbers to inaugurate a new system of 
government, to be sure, but in numbers certainly large enough to trample the old one 
to death. Some have argued, with merit, that their goals remain unclear, their motives 
diverse, their demands inarticulate, their strategy underdeveloped, and their 
leadership coarse, homophobic, and hopelessly divided against itself. Still, the death of 
the old system requires no clear vision, no unanimity of motive, no strategic acumen, 
and no enlightened leader; indeed, it does not even require the physical removal of the 
current puppet regime (Ferrara 2010b). 
 
 
 
Of the Southeast Asian countries most badly damaged economically by the 1997 
financial crisis in East Asia, Malaysia and Thailand remain the most unsettled by its 
political fallout. Their respective trajectories of crisis-induced turmoil may be tersely 
captured by the ironic swings in the fortunes of their iconic figures.  
 
In Malaysia, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Anwar Ibrahim, was 
sacked in 1998 and imprisoned for six years before being released after the ruling coalition, 
Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front) gained its biggest electoral victory ever. In the 
general election of March 2008, despite having to wait five more months before being 
legally able to contest, Anwar led the Opposition to a historic surge, inflicting the worse 
defeats ever on BN (Khoo 2008) Starting from June 2008, two months before he won a 
bye-election and returned to Parliament, he has had to face prosecution again (Khoo 2009).  
 
In Thailand, billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra took the Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) to 
electoral victories in 2001 and 2005 only to be overthrown by a military coup in 2006. With 
Thaksin in exile, and TRT dissolved by the Constitutional Court, his allies formed the 
People’s Power Party (PPP) that went on to win the election of 2007. Yet two PPP Prime 
Ministers were again deposed, and the PPP itself eventually dissolved, by judicial decisions 
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(Kenkij and Hewison 2009). Unrelenting, Thaksin’s ‘Red Shirt’ supporters and allies 
continue to challenge the current regime in demonstration after mass demonstration 
(Ferrara 2010).  
 
These two situations are not akin to ‘politics as usual’. Instead, they capture the 
unpredicted outcomes of post-crisis struggles to reorganize structures of economic and 
political power within settings framed by several important factors. First, the 1997 crisis 
undermined the legitimacy, authority and capabilities of those in power, albeit to different 
degrees. Second, the agendas of crisis management and proposed solutions were socially 
and politically divisive, mostly because of cold and desperate calculations of potential 
losses and benefits. Third, some socio-economic repercussions stemmed directly from the 
crisis while others were fused with pre-crisis conflicts in political economy. And, fourth, 
there were diverse ideological representations of the situations, ranging from the blandly 
academic to the vociferously patriotic.  
 
The causes, effects and unfolding of the 1997 crisis in both countries are too well 
rehearsed to bear repeating here. Suffice it to note that the very swift progression from 
initial currency depreciation to financial meltdown and then economic collapse was 
politically intimidating.1 Those who tried to preserve the pre-crisis order, or to overturn it, 
had to form contingent and unorthodox alliances that brought together desperate coalitions 
of interests, apparently incompatible political parties and loosely structured social 
movements. That partially explains the ‘untidy’ post-crisis politics that has not completed 
its respective courses in Malaysia and Thailand. Although the politics may be variously 
interpreted, this paper tracks it to the interplay between state, neoliberalism, and social 
movements – against the 1997 crisis, naturally, but also against deep socio-political 
contradictions in the respective societies. To that end, the paper addresses the following 
questions:  
                                                            
1 In contrast, the politics of the 2007–08 financial crisis in the West seems sedate, even with the recent 
demonstrations in Europe.  
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1. How was the state positioned vis-à-vis neoliberalism before the 1997 crisis?  
2. Within capitalist transformation, what were the antecedents of actually existing 
neoliberalism?  
3. What were the predispositions of social movements towards neoliberalism before 
the 1997 crisis?  
4. During the crisis, how did ‘political ambiguities’ influence the role of the social 
movements? 
 
 
1. Before the crisis: comparing states 
 
Beginning in its homelands of Reaganite USA and Thatcherite UK, neoliberalism, 
pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, has expanded into a 
global regime of capitalist accumulation and governance. The neoliberal extension into 
countries outside the sphere of developed economies has often been accelerated in times of 
financial and economic crises that compelled ailing economies – in Latin America, Africa 
and post-Soviet East Europe – to accept pro-market, anti-statist and anti-social sector 
structural adjustment programmes in exchange for assistance. Claiming to rest on superior 
macroeconomic policies that would establish an efficient self-regulating market as the 
cornerstone of capitalism, neoliberalism has never been merely a set of rational 
prescriptions, technocratic recommendations and institutional rules. Were the neoliberal 
agenda so impassively neutral and technocratic, its imposition would not have met as much 
resistance as it had in many parts of the world. On the contrary, neoliberalism has been ‘a 
class project, masked by a lot of neo-liberal rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, 
personal responsibility, privatization and the free market’, towards ‘the restoration and 
consolidation of class power’ (Harvey 2009). Or, as has been more graphically expressed, 
the ‘genius of neoliberalism has lain in the destruction and expropriation of existing 
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structures and goods: privatization of utilities, de-unionization of labor, means-testing of 
universal benefits, removal of tariffs and capital controls’ (Watkins 2010: 8). 
 
For emerging markets, neoliberalism in the guise of a received ideology and policy 
would restructure ‘the social, state and transnational balance of power’ (Rodan, Hewison 
and Robison 2001: 26) around which development processes and the social conflicts they 
generate took place. But the state played crucial roles in initiating this restructuring by 
controlling its scope, depth and pace. In principle, this was an issue as much of intent as 
compulsion: some states favoured neoliberal agendas, while others were forced to accept 
them. In reality, the state’s position shaped by such factors as the state’s developmental 
goals and capacities, ideological stances, and the interfaces it facilitated between the 
domestic economy and the global economy.  
 
How was the state in Malaysia and in Thailand positioned vis-à-vis neoliberalism 
before July 1997? One way of answering this question is to compare their situations – as 
part of Southeast Asian states – with those in other parts of the world. 
 
In Western capitalist economies, neoliberalism bearing the ideological forms of 
‘monetarism, Thatcherism, free market Third Way and triumphal globalization’ (Watkins 
2010: 20) rolled back the frontiers of the state. By comparison, Southeast Asian states 
displayed varying degrees of dirigiste and technocratic-managerial tendencies. Directing 
their developmental processes and economic transformation, they intervened in the 
economy to protect and promote capitalism on the whole. But without a strong domestic 
capitalist class, the Southeast Asian states sometimes built developmental capacity to 
‘govern the market’ and maintain a significant state presence in selected sectors. In other 
instances, they allowed markets and sectors to be fragmented according to political power. 
In short, state imperatives and capabilities, or even the lack thereof, tempered their trysts 
with neoliberalism.  
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Before the 1997 crisis, unlike most Latin American economies, the main Southeast 
Asian ones – Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia – belonged with the East Asian 
cluster of high-growth, export-oriented newly industrializing economies. When several 
Latin American economies were beset by financial crises followed by severe structural 
adjustment programmes, the Southeast Asian economies sustained trends of growth and 
prosperity. Their share of the so-called ‘East Asian miracle’, for all its shortcomings, 
contrasted even more sharply with the devastated African economies in roughly the same 
period. Economic success, with its socio-political payouts of stability and legitimacy, gave 
the Southeast Asian states wider policy-making scope. But success also conditioned public 
attitudes towards some of its ingredients, notably the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the real economy and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in the speculative sectors. In 
that way, the public, particularly its ‘new rich’ layers and components, were predisposed to 
participate actively in different markets.  
 
Yet, even at the pinnacle of their success in export-oriented industrialization (EOI), 
the Southeast Asian economies did not replicate the post-war records of their Northeastern 
counterparts – Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The Southeast Asian economies had long 
been more open to international trade that had structured their economies. That high degree 
of openness included a chronic dependence on FDI, coming initially from the western 
capitalist economies but, after the 1985 Plaza Accord, from East Asia itself. The Southeast 
Asian offshore manufacturing platforms were dominated by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) and crucially relied on them for employment generation and transfers of 
technology. By the 1980s, several Southeast Asian economies had become showpieces of 
EOI, but of ‘ersatz’ quality (Yoshihara 1988). Unable to translate their various strands of 
economic nationalism into homegrown, world-beating ‘autonomous development’ and 
competitiveness (Anderson 1998), the Southeast Asian states were more captive to 
neoliberal enticements or pressures the more integrated their economies were with 
globalizing markets.  
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The drive to ‘globalization’, so called, was paved with neoliberal preferences 
expressed through the ‘Washington Consensus’ – economic deregulation and liberalization, 
fiscal discipline and austerity, and privatization. To foreign capital targeting emerging 
markets, such policy and governance measures were critical for ‘opening the doors to 
investment and providing secure guarantees and exits in case of trouble’ (Hewison and 
Robison 2006: xiii). Politically, the neoliberal ideal could be a ‘sort of regulatory state, or 
system of authoritarian liberalism’ that would guarantee and uphold market freedoms by 
law and force ‘to brush aside potential opposition from organized labor, environmental 
groups, or others that may challenge the social inequalities produced by the free market’ 
(Hadiz and Robison 2006: 41). Yet many gaps existed between received neoliberal ideals 
and what were enacted as deregulation, liberalization, privatization, and fiscal discipline. 
Indeed, actually existing neoliberalism in Southeast Asian countries was not imported in 
comprehensive packages; it arose from selective and pragmatic adaptations of policies and 
measures conducive to neoliberal agendas and favourable to domestic capital. The crisis, 
therefore, did not clearly divide a pre-neoliberal past from a neoliberal present.  
 
Finally, the crisis damaged state capacity in general but the different character of the 
state in Malaysia and in Thailand influenced their ability to manage the crisis and its 
political repercussions. Managing with difficulty but without recourse to an IMF rescue 
program, the state in Malaysia could more freely face up to demands for pro-market 
reforms. Requiring IMF’s intervention, the state in Thailand was more constrained by 
IMF’s conditionalities. With prolonged hegemonic rule, the Malaysian state had become 
very much centralized, not least in its control of economic policy. Weakened, the state was 
still able to manage the crisis with its administrative machinery and mostly domestic 
resources. Able to confront the global financial market, and weather the massive political 
crisis provoked by Anwar Ibrahim’s fall, the state could resist demands for political reform 
and restructuring. The Thai political system was not as centralized and the state’s 
hegemony over civil society was more keenly contested, as evidenced by the civilian 
uprisings and military coups. Hence, there was more scope for new commercial and 
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political elites to seize the crisis as a moment to compete for state power. The differences 
between the situations in Malaysia and Thailand would eventually be shown in the kinds of 
socio-political alliances that faced off in the wake of the crisis. 
 
 
2. Antecedents of neoliberalism 
 
The trigger of the 1997 crisis – the speculative attack against the Thai baht – and the 
chief purveyor of the neoliberal solutions offered to it – the IMF – were international, that 
is, foreign. That is no reason to assume a priori that the state’s priorities were tidily 
opposed to neoliberal agendas.  
 
Malaysia was systematically interventionist and neoliberal, controlling markets but 
enacting neoliberal measures according to sectors, projects and constituencies. Many such 
‘antecedents’ of neoliberal policies were not identified as being neoliberal because they 
were enacted earlier or defended as simply ‘pragmatic’ policies. For example, the state in 
Malaysia was well known for being highly interventionist on behalf of the Malay 
community and especially the capitalist and middle classes that the state sponsored and 
promoted via its New Economic Policy (NEP). But the state also differentially protected 
and regulated segments of capital, while strictly controlling labor. At one tier of the 
economy, the state privileged the MNC-dominated EOI sector by granting it fiscal and 
other incentives but leaving its operations free of most forms of bureaucratic interference. 
At a much lower tier, the small and medium enterprise (SME) sector long remained in 
benign neglect since the state had no interest in this predominantly Chinese non-corporate 
sector. Only later, when the state planned to have SMEs become important sub-contractors 
to its heavy industries would the state actively support new SMEs, via the Proton car’s 
vendor development program, for example.  
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For a decade starting from the mid-1980s, the state implemented policies that bore 
all the hallmarks of neoliberalism. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his Minister of 
Finance introduced privatization, reduced funding for state-owned enterprises, imposed 
budgetary restraint, and repaid foreign debts early. During the 1985–86 recession, they 
suspended the NEP’s restructuring requirements to make the investment regime more 
attractive to FDI and domestic capital. As high growth resumed in the late 1980s, the state 
liberalized, deregulated and privatized social services that had previously remained under 
state control – power generation, telecommunications, waste disposal, water supply, 
healthcare services, and tertiary education (Chan 2007, Tan 2008).  
 
Those were standard neoliberal practices. Other policies and measures were not less 
so for being differently termed. The state passed property rights legislation and policies that 
advanced market-based capitalism. Into this category belonged policies to extend private 
timber-logging concessions or oil palm plantation-based cultivation into Native Customary 
Land; moves to undercut communitarian rights by re-developing Muslim wakaf land and 
‘Malay reserve’ land; the repeal of urban rent control law to benefit a new class of urban 
property developers; and strict judicial applications of property rights to areas and users 
once covered by customary usufructs and ‘unwritten contracts’.  
 
Until July 1997, there seemed not to be a contradiction between the Mahathir 
regime’s economic nationalism and neoliberalism. Indeed, the neoliberal turn could be 
justified in nationalist terms. Neoliberal practices reconciled certain state and class 
interests: privatization transferred public assets ‘held in trust’ to Malay capitalists; 
deregulation rebuilt the state’s alliance with domestic Chinese capital previously hamstrung 
by legal and administrative restrictions; and liberalization of the investment regime would 
stimulate growth towards ‘developed nation status’. Discursively, all this was packaged in 
neoliberalism’s ‘common sense’ terms: reduce public sector inefficiency and spending, and 
rely on the private sector as the source of growth. It was important in Malaysia’s 
multiethnic society that Mahathir’s interventionist-neoliberal regime spoke to Malay and 
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non-Malay capital: create asset transfer for the former, remove shackles off the latter, and, 
for both, diminish competition from the state sector.  
 
Thailand, ‘not a model of dirigiste developmentalism’ (Hewison 2006: 117) was 
less interventionist in the economy. Yet, the use of industrial policy – to expand and 
rationalize the automobile assembly sector, for example (Abdulsomad 1999) – was hardly 
unknown. As with Malaysia, the Thai state’s promotion of capitalism created many 
antecedents of neoliberalism in different phases and sectors of development. As early as 
1960, Sarit’s military junta had accepted World Bank recommendations that the state 
should ‘withdraw from new and risky industries, provide incentives and services to support 
private sector entry’, and to ‘overhaul, streamline, rationalize and tighten controls over the 
budgetary process’ (Kasian 2004: 30). These tenets, derived from an earlier paradigm of 
‘development planning’, laid the basis for capitalist expansion, in this case, via import-
substitution industrialization (ISI). The state promoted ISI with fiscal incentives, tariff 
protection and institutional support (Hewison 2001: 81–82). State policies also favoured the 
rise of domestic banks and conglomerates that dominated in turn major areas of business as 
they opened up – ‘first agriprocessing, then import-substituting consumer industries, then 
basic process industries, and then urban services’ (Pasuk and Baker 2000: 18). In certain 
areas of resource exploitation, provincial interests wrested concessions not via the 
neoliberal ideal of competitive privatization but by decentralized political power (Pasuk 
and Baker 1997).  
 
By the 1980s, Thailand’s ‘state-promoted capitalist development [had] led to the 
large-scale commodification of rural land’, increasing rural landlessness, and eventually a 
‘wholesale privatization of community lands’ for non-agricultural purposes (Kasian 2006: 
12). Regional disparities grew as a result of persistent urban bias in resource allocation and 
unbalanced patterns of development that left ‘starving the tropical forests of the 
mountainous North, the rolling savannah of the Northeast and the densely forested Malay 
peninsula’ (Kasian 2006: 11). On the whole, ‘the countryside was managed as a source of 
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labor and other inputs for urban growth (land, water, electricity generation)’, with the 
village consigned to being ‘a welfare system providing unemployment relief, retirement 
support, and many other social functions’ (Pasuk and Baker 2000; 19).  
 
State intervention was more evident and systematic in the control of labor and 
wages, whether by deploying repressive measures under the military regimes before the 
1973 uprising, or by permitting an ‘oversupply’ of migrant labor when necessary. With the 
advent of EOI and the fresh lure of FDI in the 1980s, new legislative and administrative 
restrictions were used to achieve ‘the disorganization of organized labor’ to ensure that 
‘labor remained subordinated to the changing demands of capital accumulation’ (Brown 
1997: 175–76). Consequently, working class opposition from the 1980s to early 1990s was 
focused on securing ‘a degree of autonomy, independence and space’ to ‘develop its 
organizations and legitimately contest the dictates of capital and the state over issues such 
as wages and condition, occupational health and safety, short-term employment contracts, 
social welfare and the introduction of new technology’ (Brown 1997: 176). These 
conditions did not prefigure the regime of ‘flexible labor’ prized by neoliberalism but state 
intervention in the labor market was needed to ‘free’ it from the power of unions.  
 
Moves towards more clearly neoliberal policies emerged in the 1980s following a 
structural adjustment programme that devalued the baht, launched EOI with labor-intensive 
industries, attracted more FDI flows, and spurred even more domestic investment. The 
subsequent high manufacturing-led growth of the Thai economy led to more decidedly 
neoliberal developments. For ‘big-business executives, urban politicians, mainstream 
economists, state technocrats and human-rights campaigners’ the neoliberal consensus of 
the international institutions (Kasian 2006: 21) was the ideological basis of economic 
progress towards a more deregulated free-market economy. Among the most important 
steps taken in that direction were the expansion of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), 
the liberalization of the financial sector and their deeper integration with the global 
investment market. In the transformation of the financial and corporate sectors, ‘for many 
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rising capitalists the expansion of the SET and the financial liberalization were liberating, 
as they were finally free of the control of the banking families’ (Hewison 2001: 88). 
 
 
3. Social movements vis-à-vis neoliberalism 
 
Inasmuch as social movements are formed by or represent the dispossessed, 
marginalized, powerless, and victimized, they tend to be adversarial towards the state that 
was complicit in expropriation, exploitation, discrimination and so on. Such movements 
also tend to oppose neoliberal agendas and their expressions in specific projects, even if 
some general statement of movement goals – for example, ‘a society marked by openness, 
transparency, fairness, rights and participation’ (Pasuk and Baker 1997: 35) – cannot easily 
be distinguished from neoliberal ‘good governance’ rhetoric.  
 
Such was true of Thai social movements active in diverse areas (Encarnacion-
Tadem 2001, Bantorn 2004, Shigetomi 2004, Somchai 2006, and Kenji and Hewison 2009). 
It has been argued that ‘the Thai development NGO movement [rose] to meet’ the immense 
challenge of a ‘socio-economic malaise’ caused by ‘unbalanced, unequal, unfair and 
unsustainable state-planned and promoted [sic] national economic development’ (Kasian 
2004: 34) begun after Sarit’s 1958 military coup. During the 1980s, Thai NGOs cohered as 
a socio-political movement. Opposing the ‘the excessive centralization of the state and the 
uncontrolled thrust of urban-based economic growth’, they advocated ‘a fairer society, 
better access to government, a clearer definition of human rights and more controls on the 
abuse of power’ (Pasuk and Baker 1997: 34). The organized peasantry protested urban 
encroachment on rural resources of land, forests and water. Within the environmentalist 
movement, NGOs helped to ‘articulate an ideology of peasant defence’ that challenged the 
‘development theory’ that justified the intrusion of hydro-electric dams, eucalyptus 
plantations and polluting factories. As subsequent protests protested the underlying strategy 
of economic liberalization, rural groups demonstrated against a regional meeting on trade 
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liberalization on grounds that ‘economic globalization increased the imbalance of wealth 
and power between the city and the countryside’ (Pasuk and Baker 1997: 37).  
 
Hence, environmentalism, within ‘a rapidly changing polity’, could be connected 
with broader concerns, including ‘control over resources, centralized versus decentralized 
power, bureaucratic power versus participation, and ultimately of state versus civil society’ 
(Hirsch 1997: 193). In such a milieu, the Assembly of the Poor unified many local struggles 
into a national self-sustaining social movement by providing ‘an over-arching ideological 
critique of development’ connecting local grievances to national policies, a ‘political 
identity’ to the poor as ‘victims of development’, and a ‘strategic recognition’ that political 
identity was forged through conflict and struggle (Missingham 2003: 318). Three factors 
made the 1990s ‘a decade of rural organizing, political activism and protest such as had 
never before been seen in Thailand’ – processes of development within which ‘state and 
capital increasingly moved to acquire and exploit rural environmental resources’, a ‘long 
history of rural resistance and collective struggle against subordination and exploitation’, 
and the growth of a ‘diverse middle class, which sustained a movement of political activism 
that opposed elite power and struggled for social and political reform’ (Missingham 2003: 
318).  
 
An important component of the social bases of these movements was the urban 
‘white collar working class’ that furnished ‘public intellectuals’ from the radical 
intelligentsia who had left the collapsed militancy and failed parliamentary attempts of 
the1970s for social activism through the press, public platform, and NGO (Pasuk and Baker 
1997: 34). In its own way, the Assembly of the Poor, the single largest social movement, 
embodied an alliance of urban public intellectuals and rural communities. An ‘umbrella 
organization’ for seven ‘people’s networks’,2 allied to NGOs and assisted by academics, the 
                                                            
2 The networks were the Dam Group, Land and Forest Group, State Development Project Group, Slum 
Community Group, Occupational Health Group, Alternative Agriculture Group, and Local Fisheries Group 
(Rungrawee 2004). 
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Assembly practiced ‘new ways of collective decision-making and democratic self-
management’, local representation at leadership levels, although NGO activists came to 
‘exercise power and influence … that far outweighs their small numbers’ (Missingham 
2003: 327).  
 
 In contrast to the Thai social movement experience, Malaysian social movements 
were more limited in many ways. For example, in defending community rights or 
protesting against disruptive large-scale infrastructural projects, Malaysian NGOs never 
built a movement comparable in scale of participation, durability of engagement, or 
organizational reach to the Assembly of the Poor. For comparison, NGOs, such as Alaigal 
and the Urban Pioneers Support Committee, had small numbers of dedicated activists who 
campaigned ‘in solidarity’ with workers, vegetable gardeners and ‘illegal squatters’ facing 
eviction from estates and urban fringe land on which they had worked and lived for long 
periods. Faced with big projects liable to dislocate native communities or lead to ecological 
degradation, many different NGOs might join in an ‘ad hoc’ coalition of limited aims and 
duration. More established NGOs, such as Aliran, SUARAM and Sisters-in-Islam, located 
in the bigger cities, concentrate their efforts on the protection of human rights and civil 
liberties. Likewise, their membership is limited, but since they interpret human rights and 
civil liberties in broad democratic and constitutional ways, they frequently network via an 
‘ad hoc coalition’, formed with other NGOs and political parties to mount a politically 
important or urgent campaign.  
 
Over the years, the activities or Malaysian NGOs have chiefly been conducted for 
public awareness, education and protest. Some of these have inspired new groups of 
younger activists, including young professionals and new graduates (the latter freed from 
prohibition of political participation in schools and tertiary institutions) who have linked 
different kinds of socio-political issues in their work. For instance, campaigning for the 
repeal of repressive statues infringing on constitutional rights to freedoms of expression, 
association and assembly, can be linked to demands for fixed and minimum wages for 
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estate workers, or support for harassed and abused migrant workers. A few religious NGOs 
– such as the (Muslim) Jamaah Islah Malaysia and the (Catholic) Penang Office of Human 
Development – have joined civil protests and demonstrations against the state’s 
intensifying authoritarianism. The NGOs, too, are rarely involved in development-related 
activities for several reasons. No NGO can remotely approach the state’s extensive 
programmes in development and social services. Some niches in education, community 
investment and relief work are available but many of these have been occupied by different 
parties of the ruling coalition to extents rarely encountered elsewhere. It is no exaggeration 
to say the pervasiveness of state and ruling party coverage of developmental activities have 
crowded out the NGOs.  
 
A point made about civil society in relation to NGOs in Malaysia is relevant here: 
‘civil society itself is conflict-ridden, harbours ethnic hierarchies, and conflicting class 
visions and identities and is subject to repression’ (Cooke 2003: 179). Of these ‘flaws’ of 
civil society, ethnic identities and divisiveness are particularly weakening. The point is not 
that NGOs are habitually pitted against one another in ethnic competition, but they are 
typically based in specific ethnic communities. Two notable examples illustrate this 
problem. An NGO with a rare mass membership, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, 
or Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), operated exclusively among Muslims until it 
joined other NGOs to fight against proposed amendments to the Societies Act that would 
restrict politics to self-declared ‘political’ societies. Another NGO which had mass support 
was Dongjiao Zong, the standard bearer of the Chinese education movement and intimately 
associated with the Chinese community (even if Dongjiao Zong joined civil society 
campaigns with other NGOs and opposition parties).  
 
In short, if the Malaysian NGOs have putative ideological clarity, particularly 
towards neoliberalism, it is unexpressed. Broadly defined solidarity work against repression 
and for opening up political space do not require an ideological commonality beyond a 
commitment to ‘justice, democracy, solidarity’ – Aliran’s slogan. Where NGOs dissent 
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they mostly target the state, but a state with very definite characteristics. The state has been 
developmentalist since 1970 and the economic outcomes have been largely acceptable to 
the middle-class activists who form the core of NGO personnel. But the state discriminates 
by ethnicity, and has since the 1997 crisis been much criticized for inefficiency, 
incompetence and corruption. Insofar as the market could be more level and transparent, 
many NGO activists – particularly if they are non-Malay – could blend a political anti-
statist stance with a neoliberal preference for the superiority of the private sector. This had 
a significant impact on the politics of the crisis.  
 
 
4. Thwarting neoliberalism 
 
Again, the details and controversies of the post-crisis measures taken by the state in 
Malaysia and Thailand are too well known to repeat them in detail here. But it is necessary 
to note that their differences precipitated political struggles that led to contrasting responses 
of their respective social movements towards neoliberalism.  
 
Faced with depleted foreign reserves (after a futile defence of the baht up to July 2, 
1997), collapsing currency and stock values, capital flight, widespread banking and 
corporate insolvency, Thailand was forced to turn to the IMF for rescue. Via several Letters 
of Intent, IMF imposed its standard, that is, neoliberal and pro-market, structural 
adjustment programme: tighten monetary and fiscal policy, pay off foreign creditors, slash 
public spending, liberalize rules on foreign investment, keep wages low, improve corporate 
governance, and privatize state enterprises. Not an unregulated speculative money market 
was considered to be at fault but only ‘crony capitalism’, and so, a free market was the 
antidote. The IMF reform package damaged or threatened so many sections of society as to 
provoke a powerful ‘nationalist’ backlash. Business interests baulked because whereas 
‘foreign capital has usually retreated and domestic business had been able to expand’ 
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(Hewison 2006: 121) in previous economic crises, now the reverse happened under IMF 
oversight.3  
 
By shifting support from domestic capital to ‘more generalized support for business 
that advantaged foreign investors, the IMF, World Bank and Chuan government announced 
that the old consensus could not be re-established’ (Hewison 2006: 128). However, the IMF, 
the Democrat Party government, and some technocrats who supported systemic neoliberal 
reform had miscalculated. One crucial political product of the attempted Thai embrace of 
neoliberal reform was: ‘All elements of the developmental social contract disintegrated: 
workers were unemployed, the rural poor were deeply distressed by the crisis, local 
business was being crushed, and widespread, Indonesian-like social conflict was feared’ 
(Hewison 2006: 128). In those uncertain times, Thaksin Shinawatra and Thai Rak Thai 
engineered a new ‘social contract’ – that bound domestic capital, big and small and 
medium-scale, intellectuals, labor unions, civil society figures, NGO activists, and the poor 
(particularly the rural poor) to join battle against neoliberalism and the IMF – and won the 
first post-crisis election in 2001. 
 
Three years earlier, Mahathir remained in power doing essentially what Thaksin did 
to gain power: defend domestic capital and preserve the ‘developmental social contract’ at 
all costs and mount a counterattack on neoliberalism in the process. For over a year after 
July 1997, Malaysia experimented with crisis management methods that at one time 
seemed like ‘an IMF package without the IMF’ – higher interest rates, shorter definition 
periods for non-performing loans and fiscal cutbacks. But Mahathir himself refused to 
abide by the neoliberal demands and prescriptions of the global finance market, IMF and 
the regional media. Finally, on 1 September, 1998, with greater domestic resources and in a 
less vulnerable position than Thailand, the state in Malaysia fought back with a currency 
                                                            
3 Between the second half of 1998 and the end of 1999, Thailand received increased capital inflows, most of 
which ‘came from international companies taking advantage of very good pricing. Almost none went into 
new ventures’ (Pasuk and Baker 2000: 218). 
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peg and limited capital controls. Behind these, the state carried out exercises in 
recapitalization, rescue and reflation to overcome the recession that had set in.4   
 
The state had several key motives: protect the strategic financial sector from 
collapse; save domestic conglomerates from any ‘fire sale’ to foreign investors; preserve 
the Malay advance under NEP from any ‘market leveling’; and stabilize the economy for 
everyone else. An advocate and practitioner of privatization and liberalization, Mahathir 
defiantly refused to contemplate further foreign entry into the state-protected sectors. If he 
had to re-nationalize failing privatized entities, he would do so with public funds. If he had 
to sell Malay assets, he declared, he would sell them to ‘friendly’ domestic Chinese 
investors and buy them back in more favorable times. In contrast to Thailand, then, 
although there were neoliberal-minded reformers among state technocrats – and sometimes 
Anwar Ibrahim could sound sympathetic to the neoliberal paradigm5 – the state led the 
campaign against neoliberal reform. But Mahathir, too, had miscalculated. One day after 
imposing capital controls, he sacked Anwar and persecuted him, only to provoke a 
Malaysian Reformasi, mostly a Malay revolt that Mahathir never thought would arise 
(Khoo 2003: 100–08).  
 
Thus social movements in the two countries were drawn into broader struggles 
involving neoliberalism, but they took different sides, as it were. With the IMF behind it, 
the regime in Thailand pressed for neoliberal reform but it came to grief largely between 
the ‘nationalism’ of domestic capital and the ‘populism’ of the poor. The social movements 
and the rural poor in particular supported the campaign of Thaksin and the TRT whose 
‘handsome victory [in 2001] marked a rejection of the IMF-brokered policies of the 
Democrat-led government’ (Hewison 2006: 124). In Malaysia, however, the pre-eminent 
anti-neoliberal actor was the state which defended its own nationalist-capitalist project that 
                                                            
4 For a fuller treatment of the Mahathir regime’s crisis management, see Khoo (2003: 47–60). 
5 Anwar was quoted thus: ‘in politics I am a liberal but in economics I am a conservative’. See ‘Crony 
capitalism in Asia will be reduced, says Anwar’, Business Times, 29 January 1988. 
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had begun since NEP and was extended into Mahathir’s long administration. Except for 
scattered criticisms of the global market for precipitating the currency crisis and criticisms 
of the state for its poor economic management, the social movements did not develop any 
coherent views of neoliberal economics then. When Anwar fell and was persecuted for 
defying Mahathir’s regime, the social movements and opposition parties formed a civil 
society-based coalition to defend him. At that juncture social movements attacked the state 
for its ‘KKN’, borrowed from the Indonesian Reformasi’s anti-Suharto code for kolusi, 
korupsi and nepotisme (collusion, corruption and nepotism). That line of attack coincided 
with one of neoliberalism’s favourite political criticisms of ‘the Asian model of capitalism’. 
For the moment, though, there was to be no further expansion of neoliberalism according to 
the dictates of the global financial market and the Washington Consensus. In the general 
election of November 1999, Mahathir and BN gained a victory, though a flawed one due to 
UMNO’s considerable losses in Malay-majority constituencies, and continued to rule, aided 
by economic recovery and the repression of Reformasi. 
 
In hindsight, if ‘[n]eoliberals within the World Bank and the IMF expected liberal 
economic reforms to transpire as a matter of course after the shock of a devastating 
economic crisis’ (Hadiz and Robison 2006: 41), their envisioned systemic neoliberal 
restructuring was thwarted in Thailand and Malaysia,6 despite the time lag between their 
decisive moments, and the different routes taken by different actors. So to speak, 
neoliberalism in Thailand and Malaysia lacked a ‘genuinely liberal party’ that could push a 
market reform agenda, and not simply ‘isolated pockets of liberals in a few government 
                                                            
6 Elsewhere, too: ‘… some political observers of Indonesia expected a gradual, but more or less linear, change 
in the direction of liberal democratic modes of governance, once Soeharto’s regime had crumbled and the 
institutional skeleton of markets and democracy had been put in place. However, rather than being a simple 
technical problem of institutional design, the Indonesian case has underlined the fact that economic and 
political reforms of any type needed to be enforced politically and through political struggle’ (Hadiz and 
Robison 2006: 41) 
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ministries and agencies, and some academics and intellectuals’ (Hadiz and Robison: 2006: 
41–42). 
 
 
5. Ambiguities in policy and practice 
 
But even if the crisis had not produced neoliberal regimes, the neoliberal character 
of major policies was exposed by their implementation. By the 2000s, Malaysian 
privatization and deregulation were no longer the aids to economic efficiency first touted 
by the Mahathir administration two decades earlier. Now their neoliberal character was 
bared in unexpected but recognizable ways and assailed from an unexpected perspective by 
a renewed coalition of social movements and opposition parties. In the mid-2000s, 
economic conditions again turned less favourable for the middle and lower classes. At the 
same time, political conditions became more favourable for the Opposition when the post-
Mahathir UMNO brazenly and repeatedly displayed its arrogance of power. Released from 
prison in 2004, Anwar rejuvenated the Opposition, again supported by NGOs, and led a 
broad movement to attack BN and its regime.  
 
The substantive and discursive dimensions of the new assault were not elaborated 
such as to constitute a categorical attack on neoliberal policies – or statist ones, come to 
that. But, intriguingly, the criticisms seemed to be partially anti-statist and partially anti-
neoliberal. Popular disaffection grew in response to rising costs of oligopolistic services 
and utilities supplied by ‘an oligarchy of privatisation’ – politically favoured highway 
concessionaires, electrical power producers, urban waste disposal providers, and urban light 
rapid operators. The neoliberal dimensions of these entities were their privatized status and 
the substitution of public delivery systems with user-pay market operations. Their statist 
dimensions, however, lay in the non-transparent contract awards, and financing and profit 
terms drawn up between the state and its concessionaires. Attacking both dimensions of the 
issue, the Opposition and their NGO allies essentially reverted to their decade-old ‘KKN’ 
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formula, targeting ‘Mahathir’s cronies’, Umnoputera,7 and corruption. The attacks went 
furthest in renouncing the NEP as a policy instrument that had been subverted by elite 
capture. Discursively, the Opposition, with tremendous voter support and social movement 
backing, could have criticized that established system of politically managed privatization 
as a form of ‘crony neoliberalism’.8 In Malaysia’s ethnicized political economy, a 
seemingly oxymoronic ‘crony neoliberalism’ could refer to a state-sanctioned hybrid of 
crony capitalism and market capitalism that offered something for everyone: state-created 
privilege for a multiethnic oligarchy, state-crafted social protection for Malays, market 
competition for the Chinese, and market-induced marginalization for the Indians.9 
 
The new Opposition coalition (Pakatan Rakyat, PR, or People’s Alliance) for the 
2008 general election had an ambiguous stance towards the market and neoliberalism in its 
New Economic Agenda (NEA). On the one hand, the NEA contained ‘pro-people’, 
welfarist elements reflecting the populist commonalities of the Parti Keadilan Nasional 
(PKR, or National Justice Party), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Islam (PAS, or 
Islamic Party). On the other hand, the NEA offered pro-market, neoliberal-sounding 
reassurances that good governance and transparency, ending corruption and cronyism, 
would stimulate higher levels of foreign and domestic investment, and retrieve declining 
‘national competitiveness’. Hence, a hybrid of sorts, on PR’s part, too! In the way that these 
sentiments are ethnically correlated in Malaysia, the NEA partially reflected lingering non-
Malay anti-statist stances and partially harboured rising Malay pro-market aspirations. 
Could it be that the NEA – claiming to be multiethnic – wanted to weld the ‘efficiency of 
the market’ to the ‘welfarism of the state’? 
                                                            
7 ‘Umnoputera’ – a popular derivative of the official term, Bumiputera, designating Malays and other 
indigenous communities, unlike the Chinese and Indian (or other) descendants of immigrants – used by critics 
of the regime to denote and deride UMNO leaders and members who profited from cronyistic dealings. 
8 The much more extensive and expensive bailouts of banks in USA and Europe in the 2007–08 crisis, if not 
earlier, conclusively show that neoliberalism is far from being immune to cronyism. 
9 To take only the three largest ethnic groups for the illustration of a point. 
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Something of a similar policy bifurcation underscored the five years of Thaksin’s 
administration. At one end, there were populist measures to alleviate the hardships of the 
poor, especially in the rural Northeast region. The TRT’s 30-baht universal health care 
charge, 1-million baht soft loan each for villages and poor urban communities, and farmer 
debt moratorium may have been indefensibly populist in neoliberal eyes. Later proposals 
targeted urban housing needs, small-scale entrepreneurial activity and social safety nets. To 
the poor, rural especially but urban as well, these were measures of specific and immediate 
relief – and evidence that a new party had arisen that implemented what it promised.10 At 
the other end of the TRT regime’s policy spectrum was an effort to rescue domestic capital 
from being crushed by the crisis and external competition. The effort was part statist and 
part neoliberal in the ways that these directions became less and less easy to separate. 
Compared to the pre-crisis period, a more developmentalist direction of economic growth 
was set, with the state mobilizing and allocating credit and other resources. To allow time 
and space for domestic capital to fortify itself for competition, the Thaksin regime delayed 
privatization and liberalization for a couple of years until the economy recovered and a 
renewed prosperity raised income and consumption levels. When privatization was 
resumed, it ambitiously covered energy, water, transportation and telecommunications. If 
this was neoliberal, it was also cronyistic, benefitting a politically connected coterie 
(Kasian 2006: 27). Most controversially, when selected sectors were deregulated and 
liberalized, the outcomes were particularly beneficial to the Thaksin family’s corporate 
assets.  
 
In contrast to the rural support for his populism, the urban middle-classes, labor 
unions, business rivals, royalists, the military, and the judiciary would turn against Thaksin 
on many charges, but none so widely unifying as the matter of his ‘corruption’. Economics 
                                                            
10 Kenkij and Hewison (2009: 461) suggests that TRT’s policies allowed the party direct influence over the 
poor instead of gaining it via social movements as was the case when Thaksin was negotiating for social 
movement support before the 2001 election.  
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alone was not the undoing of Thaksin’s regime. The callous disregard for human rights, 
minority grievances, media freedom, and even civil society dissent was a huge problem. A 
third was the suspicion and resentment that Thaksin and TRT’s growing power aroused 
among non-representative political circles, namely, the military and the monarchy. When 
the constellation of mostly Bangkok-based ‘Yellow Shirts’ gathered to oust Thaksin, TRT’s 
solid rural support in the general election of 2005 kept him and the party in power. The 
denouement arrived in the shape of a military coup in 2006. But by then, the political fight 
in Thailand was not principally about ‘toppling neoliberalism’.11 
 
 
6. Social movements and the ‘old orders’  
 
It has been said, critically if not disapprovingly, of social movements in general that 
they tend to focus on single concerns, lack systematic analyses of structural issues, operate 
along identity lines, pursue tactical and limited gains, enter short-term alliances with 
strange partners, ignore the deeper power dimensions of politics, et cetera. Much of this can 
be conceded in general so long as one does not rule out that in certain historically specific 
circumstances, social movements can exert political influence beyond their limited 
resources, visions and organizations. This is illustrated by the trajectories of the post-crisis 
politics in Malaysia or in Thailand which have yet to complete their courses. Some of the 
twists and turns in those political struggles are directly traceable to the 1997 crisis of 
neoliberalism and the ensuing demands for pro-market reforms and restructuring. In 
response, different quarters mounted counter-attacks deploying and mixing various 
nationalist and populist, radical and conservative measures and idioms. Over those political 
struggles, interventions by popular forces and social movements exerted differing degrees 
of influence, often to unsuspected outcomes – to the rise of Thaksin and TRT, and the 
                                                            
11 Two articles which are influential in my reading of this phase of Thai politics are Kasian (2006), ‘Toppling 
Thaksin’, and Thongchai (2008), ‘Toppling Democracy’, the second being something of a critical rejoinder to 
the first. 
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resurgence of Anwar and PR. Yet, the full force of intervention by social movements in 
both situations could only be appreciated when they were related to longer socio-political 
struggles, some affected by longer-term neoliberal trends, others of decidedly different 
character. In a way, the former is better illustrated by the unpredicted rise of the Hindu 
Rights Action Front (HINDRAF) in November 2007, the latter by the emergence of the 
Red Shirts in Thailand. Each captures a different motif within the political history of their 
country. 
 
On 25 November 2007, the largest ever demonstration by the Indian community 
took place in Kuala Lumpur. The estimated number of Indian demonstrators – about 30,000 
– was unprecedented for Malaysia, especially since the Indian community’s overall 
electoral support for BN had been taken for granted. This amorphous movement, called by 
obscure leaders, declared itself to be against the continued ‘marginalisation’12 that had left 
Indians increasingly bereft of social and economic opportunity. HINDRAF charged that the 
position of the Indians in Malaysia had deteriorated as a consequence of unfulfilled 
promises and state neglect. State neglect here meant at least two things – NEP-justified 
official discrimination against non-Malays, and the exposure of an unprotected minority to 
market forces and competition. Leaving aside its specific demands, some of which were 
dismissed by unsympathetic observers as being outlandish, HINDRAF demanded the 
restitution of ‘Hindu rights’ in different forms – to ethnic equality, economic equity, and in 
the areas of culture and religion. Of course, it was analytically and politically possible even 
in November 2007 to caution that HINDRAF was ethnically over-conscious, if not outright 
chauvinistic: after all, not all Indians are Hindus anyway, including many of the protesters. 
Yet, the recent causes of the unsatisfactory Indian condition were attributable to: lack of 
improvement in working conditions, the repression of organized labor, the importation of 
migrant labor, the privatization of services, the supersession of property rights over 
customary ones, the increasing reliance on the private sector for growth, et cetera. In short, 
the problem lay in an increasingly neoliberal pathway of capitalist development at popular 
                                                            
12 Movement participants most frequently use this term to describe their condition.  
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levels that left too many descendants of migrant Indian labor imported into British Malaya 
straggling.   
 
The true impact of HINDRAF lay in its coincidence with two other movements 
(Khoo 2007). One was the Bar Council’s protest, in September 2007, supported by almost 
all NGOs, against the corruption and abuse of the judiciary after repeated instances of 
political interference and commercial bribery were exposed. The other was a movement 
called BERSIH (‘clean’), an ad hoc coalition of opposition parties and NGOs that 
demanded an end to many kinds of electoral improprieties committed by the ruling 
coalition with the aid of existing institutions. In both cases, the motif of restitution was 
likewise present: restore confidence in the institution of the judiciary and restore voters’ 
rights to free and fair elections – each indispensable to democracy. These three eruptions 
about four to six months before the general election of March 2008 framed the electoral 
revolt that would bring unprecedented victories to the PR even though BN remained in 
control of the federal government. A decade earlier, Reformasi, a political by-product of the 
crisis of neoliberalism was too tentative and ineffective an onslaught by social movements 
and opposition parties. In March 2008, the electoral ‘tsunami’, as it has been hyped, 
resumed that combined assault on the politico-economic foundations of the electoral system. 
Whatever the outcome of current political struggles over the immediate future, the small, ad 
hoc, and unsystematic social movements have rendered significant contribution to the 
opening of political space and the questioning of political economy. 
 
The situation in Thailand is potentially even more far-reaching. Clearly, the social 
movements there were always more powerful than those in Malaysia. In spite of military 
rule, Thailand has had a long record of peasant protests, rural demonstrations and mass 
actions, and urban uprisings against dictatorships and military juntas. Between the mid-
point and the end of the neoliberal boom period, there were ‘reportedly 739 mass 
demonstrations in 1994, 754 in 1995 and 1,200 in 1997’ (Kasian 2006: 21). In the 1990s, 
social movements, including the Assembly of the Poor, had organized mass marches and 
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mounted campaigns to heighten ‘media visibility’, ‘discursive contestation’ and ‘theatrics 
of resistance’ (Rungrawee 2004: 549– 60), thereby displaying sufficient political force to 
conduct in situ negotiations with state officials and extracting concessions from them. 
 
That a large number of Thai social movements turned against Thaksin personally 
and TRT as a party from late 2005 onwards – for reneging on reform promises, for 
corruption, and for increasingly intolerant rule (Kenkij and Hewison 2009: 459–64)13 – 
might have initiated the polarization of the populace that used to stand behind the social 
movements for reform. The support of largely Bangkok-based middle-classes and domestic 
capital for Thaksin and TRT, on ‘nationalist’ grounds, has vanished; in its place rose the 
predominantly urban anti-Thaksin People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and its Yellow 
Shirt supporters. The PAD, with its alliance with commercial interests, support for the 
military coup of September 2006, appeal for monarchical intervention, and its subsequent 
campaigns against the post-coup ‘clones’ of TRT occupied one polar position. Ranged 
against the PAD is the ‘populist’ rump of the original coalition that Thaksin and TRT 
forged to combat neoliberalism, now reinvented as the United Front of Democracy against 
Dictatorship (UDD). The UDD’s Red Shirts have continued with a vengeance the tradition 
of local groups and rural protestors who had been ‘bringing their grievances to the focus of 
power in Bangkok’ (Pasuk and Baker 1997: 36–37).  
 
In a sense, the flaws of social movements, briefly noted above, may have come 
together dramatically and ironically in the division of popular forces – no doubt 
manipulated to different degrees by other actors – according to an ‘urban uncivil society’ 
long responsible for encroaching on the countryside and a ‘tyranny of the rural majority’ 
with its electorally superior numbers (Kasian 2006: 15). As Kasian has wryly observed, the 
division is almost tragicomic: the urban middle-classes whose several uprisings against 
                                                            
13 Or the leaders of the movements and NGOs, to be precise, rather than the grassroots support they were 
supposed to lead or represent. I wish to thank Chris Baker for clarifying this point for me during his seminar 
at IDE, April 27, 2010.  
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military dictatorship advanced Thai democracy now ‘pin their hopes for rights and 
freedoms on the elite of army and feudal aristocracy’, while ‘the grassroots masses pin their 
hopes for social and economic justice on the big monopoly capitalist class’ (Kasian 2007). 
These color-coded struggles with their complex alliances of social classes and political 
forces must yet be placed within other motifs, politically complex ones. One such motif is 
the struggle of royalists to restore monarchy to superiority vis-à-vis Thai democracy since a 
military coup in 1932 compelled the monarchy to shed its absolutist powers (Thongchai 
2008). Another motif is summed up in the following observation of the latest demonstration 
(March to May 2010) in Bangkok by the Red Shirts who first came in their thousands from 
the countryside but were later supported by many from Bangkok’s ‘lower classes’: 
the red shirts do not embody the lofty democratic ideals of a relatively small, 
largely urban minority. The red shirts are rather the vehicle for the anger and 
frustration of perhaps tens of millions of people living in some of the country’s 
most populous regions. These people are tired of being second-class citizens. They 
are tired of being disenfranchised. They are tired of being told by those who have 
gotten rich through bribery and exploitation that they are too goddamn stupid, 
ignorant, or dark-skinned to have the right to elect their own leaders, speak their 
own minds, and enjoy a minimum of economic opportunity (Ferrara 2010a).14 
On a smaller scale, modified according to time and place and conditions, this latter 
theme was glimpsed in Malaysia where a decade-long progression from Reformasi to the 
‘tsunami’ has come close to ‘trampling the old [order] to death’.15 Neoliberalism 
contributed to that trampling without remaking either social order in its image. That was 
                                                            
14 It is beyond this paper to consider in any depth the March-May 2010 ‘Bangkok uprising’ but the scale, 
forms of protest, strategies and demands showed the transformation of social movements into a galvanized 
political movement with objectives that went far beyond what is typically associated with social movements. 
In Bangkok, on the night of the day this paper was presented, the regime carried out its first military assault 
on the Red Shirts but it was rebuffed, albeit with heavy casualties. As it turned out, this was merely a 
rehearsal for a second, more violent and decisive attack by the military. 
15 See epigram at the start of the paper. 
27 
 
partly because of the resistance of social movements. But the social movements are not 
nearer to realizing their goals of fairer societies, not least because neoliberalism remains an 
obstacle. To that degree, perhaps social movements and neoliberalism have confounded 
each other.  
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